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As complexity for treating patients increases, so does the risk of error. Some pub-
lications have suggested that record and verify (R&V) systems may contribute in
propagating errors. Direct data transfer has the potential to eliminate most, but not
all, errors. And although the dosimetric consequences may be obvious in some
cases, a detailed study does not exist. In this effort, we examined potential errors
in terms of scenarios, pathways of occurrence, and dosimetry. Our goal was to
prioritize error prevention according to likelihood of event and dosimetric impact.
For conventional photon treatments, we investigated errors of incorrect source-to-
surface distance (SSD), energy, omitted wedge (physical, dynamic, or universal)
or compensating filter, incorrect wedge or compensating filter orientation, improper
rotational rate for arc therapy, and geometrical misses due to incorrect gantry, col-
limator or table angle, reversed field settings, and setup errors. For electron beam
therapy, errors investigated included incorrect energy, incorrect SSD, along with
geometric misses. For special procedures we examined errors for total body irra-
diation (TBI, incorrect field size, dose rate, treatment distance) and LINAC
radiosurgery (incorrect collimation setting, incorrect rotational parameters). Like-
lihood of error was determined and subsequently rated according to our history of
detecting such errors. Dosimetric evaluation was conducted by using dosimetric
data, treatment plans, or measurements. We found geometric misses to have the
highest error probability. They most often occurred due to improper setup via co-
ordinate shift errors or incorrect field shaping. The dosimetric impact is unique for
each case and depends on the proportion of fields in error and volume mistreated.
These errors were short-lived due to rapid detection via port films. The most sig-
nificant dosimetric error was related to a reversed wedge direction. This may occur
due to incorrect collimator angle or wedge orientation. For parallel-opposed 60°
wedge fields, this error could be as high as 80% to a point off-axis. Other examples
of dosimetric impact included the following: SSD, ~2%/cm for photons or elec-
trons; photon energy (6 MV vs. 18 MV), on average 16% depending on depth,
electron energy, ~0.5 cm of depth coverage per MeV (mega-electron volt). Of
these examples, incorrect distances were most likely but rapidly detected by in
vivo dosimetry. Errors were categorized by occurrence rate, methods and timing
of detection, longevity, and dosimetric impact. Solutions were devised according
to these criteria. To date, no one has studied the dosimetric impact of global errors
in radiation oncology. Although there is heightened awareness that with increased
use of ancillary devices and automation, there must be a parallel increase in qual-
ity check systems and processes, errors do and will continue to occur. This study
has helped us identify and prioritize potential errors in our clinic according to
frequency and dosimetric impact. For example, to reduce the use of an incorrect
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wedge direction, our clinic employs off-axis in vivo dosimetry. To avoid a treat-
ment distance setup error, we use both vertical table settings and optical distance
indicator (ODI) values to properly set up fields. As R&V systems become more
automated, more accurate and efficient data transfer will occur. This will require
further analysis. Finally, we have begun examining potential intensity-modulated
radiation therapy (IMRT) errors according to the same criteria.
PACS numbers: 87.53.Xd, 87.53.St
Key words: radiotherapy, errors, record and verify, error analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
As the complexity for planning and treating radiation oncology patients increases, so does the
potential of error. This is partially due to the increased demand for ancillary devices and the
introduction of new treatment procedures and techniques. This advancement has not necessar-
ily come simultaneously with an increase in verification capability. In fact, there has been a
simultaneous drive to expand automation, attributed to an increase in the number of daily
treatment fields. Although the use of record and verify (R&V) systems has increased, some
authors(1–5) have suggested that these devices may contribute in propagating errors, since these
systems are frequently utilized to enhance efficiency rather than as quality assurance systems.
However, with the recent advent of digital data import from treatment-planning systems and
automated treatment setups, errors associated with manual data entry and setups will be re-
duced.(6) Therefore, it is vital that processes and quality assurance procedures in any radiotherapy
department adapt to the new electronic environments so that R&V systems diminish error
propagation rather than increase it.
There are several detailed reports on error analysis(7–9) in radiation oncology in terms of
how errors occur, but a detailed analysis of the dosimetric consequences does not exist. In this
study, we examined potential errors in terms of different scenarios, pathways of error occur-
rence, and the subsequent dosimetric impact. Our goal is to prioritize error prevention according
to likelihood of an event and its dosimetric impact.
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS
Our facility treats approximately 2000 patients per year on seven LINACs, each equipped with
an R&V system (Varis v1.4g, Varian Oncology Systems or Clinical Desktop v4.10, Elekta
Oncology). Over a 30-month time period, we initiated 3964 courses of therapy. It must be
noted that neither of these systems nor the various radiotherapy treatment-planning systems at
their stage of software version were conducive for complete electronic transfer of treatment
setup data. Therefore, we had processes in place that called for comprehensive reviews of
manually entered setup parameters by an experienced medical physicist. Patients were treated
on one of five Varian LINACs (three of which were equipped with multileaf collimators, (MLCs),
or two MLC-equipped Elekta LINACs. The Varian LINACs possess tertiary physical wedges
and have the capability of delivering enhanced dynamic wedging. The Elekta machines use an
internal universal wedge. The latter two wedge systems rely on external icons to assist with
deciphering orientation on the treatment machine.
Our clinic tracks errors by means of a “notable event” procedure implemented by our Con-
tinuing Quality Improvement (CQI) Committee. Any events discovered mandate a physics
review to determine dosimetric impact, if any, and are reported to the CQI Committee. The
system is strategically designed to be nonpunitive to encourage disclosure of all events with a
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potentially negative consequence. Neither the individual(s) responsible for the event nor the
individual(s) who missed catching the error are reprimanded to encourage reporting. Rather,
information gleamed from the incident is used to modify procedures or to increase in-services
in the procedures where the error occurred. We examined events in the following treatment
categories.
A.  External photon beam
For conventional photon beam treatment, we investigated errors of incorrect source-to-surface
distance (SSD), incorrect energy, omitted wedge (physical, enhanced dynamic, or universal) or
compensating filter, incorrect wedge or compensating filter orientation, and geometrical misses
due to incorrect gantry, collimator or table angle, reversed field size, and setup errors. Because
of specific incompatibilities between various systems, neither the Varis nor Desktop R&V
systems possessed the capability of electronically verifying block or compensator trays or
bolus. Many of these errors could initiate in either simulation, treatment planning, on the treat-
ment machine, or somewhere in between.
B.  Electron beam
For electron beam therapy, the errors we investigated include the following: incorrect energy,
incorrect SSD, and geometric misses. Electron beam therapy constitutes less than 5% of treat-
ment beams used in our clinic.
C.  Special procedures
For special procedures we examined the impact of errors for total body irradiation (TBI), such
as incorrect field size, dose rate, and treatment distance. The Varis R&V system interlocks field
size by means of a special accessory mount. However, dose (or monitor unit (MU)) rate is not
interlocked, and there is no practical method to electronically confirm the extended treatment
distance because the treatment table is not used. For LINAC radiosurgery, we examined the
impact of errors due to incorrect collimation setting and incorrect rotational parameters. IMRT
was not included in this particular study.
D.  Error analysis
The likelihood of an error type was determined according to our history of detecting such
errors. In addition, the longevity of the error propagating was evaluated for each error type.
The impact of R&V along with our processes and procedures (pretreatment checks, port films,
in vivo dosimetry) was examined. Dosimetric evaluation was conducted by using existing
dosimetric data, treatment plans, or measurements. For various error types, anecdotal sce-
narios are detailed to decipher the pathway that led to such errors.
III. RESULTS
We found geometric misses to have the highest error probability for both photons and for
electrons. They most often occurred due to improper setup due to coordinate shift errors, incor-
rect field shaping, and reversed collimator jaws. The dosimetric impact is unique for each case
and depends on the proportion of fields in error and volume mistreated. These errors were
short-lived due to rapid detection via port films. A summary of error types is found in Table 1.
Examples of scenarios and pathways for some of the most common errors are presented below.
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Table 1. Summary of errors over a 30-month span. New patient starts are for 30-month period. # of R&V were the
number of errors felt to be potentially propagated by the R&V system.
Scenario A: Shift error
During CT simulation, an initial reference is scribed in image planes denoting a projected
isocenter. If subsequent treatment planning requires that the isocenter be placed 4.0 cm to the
patient’s left, requiring a need to shift the table lateral coordinates +4.0 cm, this will lead to the
table coordinates to be used for treatments. However, due to a misinterpretation, a value of –
4.0 cm could used to determine the lateral table coordinate.
There is no feasible electronic mechanism to catch this error before treatment, short of
having the coordinates checked by the physicists or therapist staff pretreatment, or a more
dramatic solution of placing the patient on a conventional simulator to confirm the isocenter
location. This particular error was determined to happen rarely enough (<0.5%) that our clinic
continues to rely exclusively on the therapists visually checking the new isocenter against
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digitally reconstructed radiographs (DRRs) generated during virtual simulation or treatment
planning. However, as we will discuss later, incorrect coordinate use, not necessarily due to
shifts, is the most common error in our clinic. Related to these errors, the R&V system some-
times contained the incorrect coordinate information (vs. the paper chart) due to an incorrect
shift instruction from the original reference point (projected isocenter) to the treatment isocenter.
This led to a process change in regards to the R&V system, whereby the in-room R&V display
monitors were turned off. Although this may seem Draconian, we felt it was vital to emphasize
that the R&V system was not a treatment setup system and should only be used to verify and
record, maintaining the paper record as the primary setup documentation. The majority of shift
errors occurred somewhat independent of the R&V system, whereby the resultant table coordi-
nates in both the paper and electronic record were derived incorrectly. Therefore, prudent checks
of the DRRs from treatment planning are the primary method of preventing such an error prior
to obtaining a port film.
The pathway for such an error is as follows:
•  Dosimetry staff incorrectly completes information sheet concerning shift. Incorrect
   table coordinates are calculated and entered. (Note: If the treatment plan was com-
   pleted before treatment commenced and a direct DICOM transfer including table
   coordinates could be made, this error would be avoided.)
•  Physics staff member fails to check shift instructions filled out by dosimetrist (rea-
   sonable process/training change).
•  Therapist staff does not check DRR in room to ensure shift has been made correctly
   (definite process/training change).
•  Diode does not facilitate error discovery.
•  Port film taken and reviewed by physician who discovers error, which is corrected
   before subsequent fraction.
A graphic depicting this scenario is exhibited in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Visual description of how a coordinate shift error, in this case a lateral shift of –4 cm instead of the planned +4 cm,
would result in an incorrect isocenter placement.
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Scenario B: Incorrect field shape
Multileaf collimator field shapes are generated for a patient requiring six fields that are planned
for the treatment of prostate and seminal vesicles (PTV1) and an additional six smaller fields
that are planned for the prostate only (PTV2). The MLC fields are exported to a directory for
this patient for later “attachment” to the R&V system for treatment. However, the treatment
planner responsible for setting up the treatment fields in the R&V system inadvertently assigns
the smaller field shape to treat PTV1. Because the field shape differences are subtle (typically
a 20% to 25% reduction in field area), a precheck of the field shapes for each field would be the
only method of detecting such an error. However, since this error was determined to happen
rarely (<0.1%), our clinic deemed this unnecessary.
The pathway for such an error is as follows:
•  Dosimetry staff inadvertently attaches incorrect MLC shapes to fields. (Note:
    A direct DICOM transfer of TP data would have averted this error.)
•  Physics staff checks individual R&V beam settings and MLC shape coinciding
    within jaw settings. However, since the initial and boost field shapes are similar and
    the boost shape is comfortably contained within initial jaw settings, the error is
    missed.
•  Therapists do not identify subtle field shape differences seen in the DRRs and treat
    with small field shapes (reiteration of policy).
•  Diode does not facilitate error discovery since d
max
 doses are nearly the same for the
    field shapes.
•  Physician discovers error on port film review.
The dosimetric impact is minimal because the reduced field shape is typically 20% smaller,
and this type of error is discovered before second fraction is delivered.
Scenario C: Reversed jaw settings
A patient receives simulation for opposed fields. The transverse jaw settings are asymmetric
for the AP field (X
1
 = 8, X
2
 = 4), which is the only field filmed on the simulator. When the chart
is being prepared, the same jaw settings are used for each of the opposed fields (the opposed PA




= 8). This scenario can also occur by a different mechanism
due to nomenclature used in the treatment-planning system, which depicts jaw settings accord-
ing to direction from isocenter (left, right, upper, lower) and lists them transversely in reverse
order for the jaw settings (X
2
 followed by X
1
). Even with these two scenarios, the error rate was
still very low (<0.3%). This is due to the fact that treatment plans are completed and then
reviewed as part of pretreatment checks by the experienced clinical physicist. The pathway and
dosimetric error are similar to scenarios A and B.
For all of these scenarios, the portal film or portal image would assuredly catch these errors.
However, if careful attention is not paid to the films, smaller errors, such as a 1 cm shift error,
may not be immediately detected.
A. Photon beam errors with dosimetric impact
Scenario D: Incorrect wedge direction
A four-field technique is planned for a pelvis patient, including opposed 18 MV lateral beams
requiring 60 wedges. The wedging is to be accomplished by use of enhanced dynamic wedg-
ing, which is accomplished by motion of collimating jaws while the beam is on and is limited
to only one jaw pair (the upper Y jaws on Varian LINACs), and therefore only one plane of
wedging is available unless a collimator rotation is applied. The collimator angle has to be
chosen strategically. The chosen direction has notation according to which jaw is moving (Y1
in
87 Klein et al.: Errors in radiation oncology... 87
Journal of Applied Clinical Medical Physics, Vol. 6, No. 3, Summer 2005
or Y2
out
) and is related to the “heel” end of the field. Because there is not an obvious method
confirmation of the wedge orientation (heel) prior to treatment as is the case with physical
wedges and incorrect collimator angle or choice of moving jaw (heel), an incorrect wedge
direction could occur. There are external icons depicting the “heel” direction that are not as
intuitive as physical wedges.
An additional problem with this type of virtual wedging is that the nomenclature used by
treatment-planning systems is not intuitive and not necessarily correlated to the nomenclature
used by the treatment machines and/or R&V systems. Therefore, a misappropriated wedge
direction could possibly go undetected by physics checks and by therapists on the first day of
treatment. Unfortunately, in vivo dosimetry performed with a diode on central axis will not
catch this particular error. Although we had the therapists check the final jaw position at the
end of treatment (indicating the “toe” of the wedge), this policy was not carried out sufficiently
to catch these errors. For the scenario described, the dosimetric error could be as high as 80%
to a point 8 cm off-axis, for opposed 60˚ wedged fields. We found this type of error occurred
when the wedge orientation was not obvious in a 2D representation of the treatment, as is the
case for central nervous system treatments requiring nonaxial fields. An example of a hypo-
thetical intra-cranial treatment with incorrect wedge directions is seen in Fig. 2. In this case,
there are a total of seven beams for which the wedge was reversed from the intended orienta-
tions for four of the seven beams. This would have resulted in an increased high dose region
(7800 cGy) outside of the tumor volume as compared with 7000 cGy in the correct plan.
Fig. 2. Comparison of isodoses for a central nervous system treatment plan that had called for seven wedged fields. The
isodose map on the right demonstrates the resultant isodoses if the wedge orientation was reversed for four of the seven
fields. The original plan used 6 MV photons with a target dose of 7000 cGy.
The pathway for such an error is as follows:
•  Dosimetry staff prepares intended plan for treatment based on MLC field shaping.
   After the planning is complete and the paper and electronic charts prepared, there is
   a decision to switch to cerrobend field shaping. In order to avoid having the weight
   of the block against the latch for some fields (a nonissue for MLC), the collimator is
   rotated 180˚ for these particular fields. Unfortunately, the original wedge direction
   is not corrected for the fields. (Mandated replanning would have avoided this error).
•  Physicist checks individual R&V beam settings but does not detect the incorrect
   wedge direction.
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•  Therapists do not closely compare wedge directions as indicated on treatment plan
   and drawings with the icons on the treatment machine.
•  Diode check does not facilitate error discovery as they are taken on central axis.
   (Change in procedure implemented, whereby diodes are now placed off-axis. Thera-
   pists are instructed to position diode 2 cm to 3 cm toward the “heel” of the wedge as
   they perceive, but then denote the direction of the diode placement according to
   anatomical direction (i.e., for a breast patient with treated wedges, diode is placed
   anterior).
•  Subsequent weekly review of chart by physicist catches the error.
Scenario E: Incorrect SSD
A breast cancer patient is planned for opposed tangents using 6 MV photons using a source-to-
axis (SAD) technique (central axis SSD of 87 cm). After simulation and planning, potential for
collision is detected at the first fraction. The chart is returned to dosimetry for recalculation for
a 100 cm SSD technique and thus new collimator settings. However, the calculation is per-
formed for the new field size, but the change to the new SSD is not clearly communicated. The
patient is successfully treated with the new SSD of 100 cm. According to calculations using the
SAD treatment MUs and the SSD treatment setup, an error of 26% dosage lower then pre-
scribed occurs. Based on 100 cm SAD machines, a rule of thumb for dose difference for photons
and electrons is a 2% change in dose per centimeter due to the inverse square effect.
The pathway for such an error is as follows:
•  Dosimetry staff corrects paper and electronic chart for new field size and deter-
    mines a new calculation is not needed.
•  Chart bypasses physicist review after changes are made.
•  Diode is taken, and upon review by the physicist it becomes obvious that the
    treatment SSD does not match the calculation SSD.
Scenario F: Incorrect photon energy
A physician initially prescribes 18 MV photons for a parallel-opposed PA/AP fields to treat the
pelvis. Calculations are performed. Due to a demanding load on the high-energy machines, the
patient is transferred to a single modality 6 MV LINAC because the PA separation (24 cm) is
felt to not mandate use of high-energy photons. However, no recalculation is performed, and
MUs for an 18 MV beam are used. For most regions beyond the entrance region (first 3 cm
from each surface), the dosimetric difference ranges from 6% to 16%. Larger differences occur
in the buildup region.
The pathway for such an error is as follows:
•  In haste, the patient is transferred to a low-energy machine. Corrections are made
    notating new machine and energy, but the therapists fail to follow departmental
    procedures, and no new calculation is performed.
•  Diode check reading catches error because the given doses (calculated 18 MV and
    measured 6 MV) are significantly different.
Scenario G: Incorrect electron energy
For electrons, the differences are more severe because the depth of penetration changes by
approximately 0.5 cm/MeV. Therefore, the larger the energy difference, the larger the differ-
ence in dose delivered. In this example, a physician prescribes 16 MeV electrons to treat a soft
tissue sarcoma to the depth of 4 cm (90% prescription), but due to a transposition error, the
patient’s machine MUs are calculated and subsequently treated with 6 MeV electrons. There is
essentially no (< 5% of prescription) dose delivered to the prescription depth in this case,
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although the prescription dose is delivered to the first 1.5 cm from the surface.
The pathway for such an error is as follows:
•  Dosimetry staff inadvertently writes incorrect energy in paper chart. (Note: A
    direct DICOM transfer of TP data would avert this error.)
•  Physicist misses the incorrect energy recording during initial chart review.
•  During subsequent weekly chart checks, physics discovers discrepancy. (Note: Di-
    ode checks are not performed for electron beams.)
•  Such errors emphasize the need to carefully review prescription parameters
    and subsequent recording of patients’ treatment machine parameters.
B. Special procedure scenarios
For TBI, delivery errors were determined to be highly unlikely, with the exception of dose rate.
This parameter and total treatment time (related to dose rate) are not checked by most R&V
systems. However, for clinics employing low versus high (10 vs. 30 cGy/min) dose rate proto-
cols, such an error is possible. This occurs because some R&V systems do not use time or dose
rate as a comparative fields due to variance of dose rate during the treatment. Therefore, the
dose rate is appropriated by the MU/min rate set by the therapists. In our facility we employ
low and high dose rates that are appropriate according to protocols that are either a single
fraction of 550 cGy (high dose rate) or multifraction (low dose rate) with a typical 175 cGy per
fraction. Therefore, the total time to deliver either treatment modality is ~18 min/fraction or ~9
min/field for our parallel opposed technique, although the MUs differ by a factor of 3. In one
hypothetical  case, if a high-dose single fraction was to be delivered, but instead of appropriat-
ing the higher dose rate (according to a MU rate of 400 MU/min) a lower dose rate was set (by
programming a low MU/min rate of 100), the patient could potentially be irradiated for as long
as 50 min or 25 min/side. This would be catastrophic for the patient if it were not for the ability
to set a default maximum time to deliver a TBI treatment. However, a simple key function does
allow the maximum time to be exceeded. In the opposite error scenario, whereby a low dose
rate protocol was prescribed, the therapists could program a high dose rate, and a very rapid
treatment (~2.5 min/field) could be delivered. In this case, the LINAC has no functionality to
avoid such a mistreatment. Although this error is most likely less damaging to the patient, the
biological impact is unknown.
Accelerator-based stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS), typically not interlocked for field size,
has the potential for delivering collimator field sizes that exceed the outer diameter of the
stereotactic collimating system. The collimating systems have inner treatment diameters rang-
ing from 4 mm to 40 mm and an outer diameter of 80 mm to 100 mm. This error would lead to
significant dosage of the target region on the order of the prescriptive dose. This dosimetric
impact is potentially serious because the MUs are well into the thousands. It is highly desirable
that field sizes for LINAC SRS be either interlocked (not currently available on most LINACs)
or integrated within an R&V system.
The two hypothetical scenarios clearly point out the need to have a rigorous double check
policy (zero tolerance) in place for special procedures irradiation techniques.
C. Frequency analysis
From January 2001 to June 2003, all disclosed and/or discovered errors were tracked. Details
were provided for each error with identification if the R&V system possibly propagated the
error, or as in some cases, was not used for treatment. Throughout this period of time, decisions
were made to change process or add an additional quality assurance check. These decisions
were based on both frequency and dosimetric impact. Table 1 tallies the error types in order of
frequency.
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Other errors that occurred once and that did not lead to any policy or process change in-
cluded the following (these are grouped according to error type, frequency, detection method,
and R&V contribution):
•  incorrect wedge angle: one fraction: diode detection; R&V propagated
•  missing bolus: four fractions: physics check; not applicable
•  incorrect electron energy: three fractions: physics check; R&V propagated
•  missing wedge: two fractions: diode detected; R&V propagated
•  incorrect table angle: one fraction: port film; R&V propagated
•  one (of three fields) not treated: one fraction: therapist discovery; R&V not being
    used
•  wrong patient parameters used for first of four fields: therapist discovery; R&V
    propagated
The error pathways can be categorized to three types:
     1. An error that is easily detected after the first fraction by a port film. Although these are
high in frequency, they are almost always detected before the second fraction and
therefore have neither longevity nor subsequent dosimetric impact.
     2. An error that is not detectable by port film but has a high likelihood of being detected
by in vivo (diode) dosimeters and/or initial physicist chart review. These checks should
take place before the second fraction but have gone as long as five fractions. In any
case, there is minimal longevity and, therefore, only minimal dosimetric impact.
3 . An error that is not detectable by port film or central axis diode or initial physicist
review. These errors, although infrequent, have the chance to go undetected for many
fractions and in many cases (e.g., an incorrectly oriented accessory) have very high
dosimetric impact.
Breaking this up further according to dosimetric impact, longevity, and likelihood, Table 2
categorizes the errors previously mentioned for external beam even further.
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Table 2. Error types from Table 1 as categorized according to frequency, longevity, and dosimetric impact, using
criteria below.
H = high; M = medium; L = low
Key:
Frequency: according to our history of occurrence rate
H: > 0.25%
M: 0.1% to 0.25%
L: < 0.1%
Longevity: according to number of fractions
H: potentially >5 fractions and only picked up by careful weekly chart review
M: missed by port film, but assuredly discovered by diode on first check
L: caught by initial port film
Dosimetric impact: according to error of dose and/or volume
H: error of potentially > 20% per fraction in terms of dose and/or treated volume
M: error between 10% and 20% per fraction in terms of dose and/or treated volume
L: error < 10% per fraction in terms of dose and/or treated volume
Figure 3 graphically demonstrates the various pathways of the various error types.
92 Klein et al.: Errors in radiation oncology... 92
Journal of Applied Clinical Medical Physics, Vol. 6, No. 3, Summer 2005
Fig. 3. Flowchart of various error types. (1) Caught by port film review; (2) caught by chart and/or diode review; and (3)
potentially undetected, and how the processes either stop or miss such errors.
In light of the errors with high frequency and of those with high dosimetric impact, we had
made the following changes in our clinical process:
     1. To reduce the errors with high frequency (H in Table 2), we determined that the R&V
system had actually propagated some of these errors (Table 1). We therefore reduced
override rights for the therapists along with reinforcing our departmental policy of
reviewing the paper chart rather than the electronic R&V display. The therapists are
not the originators of such errors, but these procedural changes certainly increase the
likelihood of therapists catching these entry errors. In addition, we added a redundant
system to confirm setup SSDs by having the therapists double-check setup SSD, ver-
tical table settings, and lateral setup marks on the patient. Some R&V systems do not
allow finely tuned privileges for therapists and other users, which can compromise the
effectiveness of the record and verify process. Figures 3 and 4 depict changes in error
pathways before and after these changes.
     2. To reduce the likelihood of the infrequent (low frequency) but dosimetrically signifi-
cant error (high dosimetric impact and high longevity) of an incorrectly oriented
accessory (wedge or compensation filter), our policy was changed to require diodes
be placed off-axis. This action requires the therapists to place the diode at a known
distance off-axis, at a known SSD. The therapist records the direction off-axis relative
to patient (e.g., anterior, superior, lateral). When the diode readings are reviewed,
corrections are made for the off-axis accessory transmission. Since this change was
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made, there have been multiple occasions in which the off-axis diode reading has d
etected an incorrect wedge orientation. Figures 3 and 4 depict changes for this particu-
lar error pathways before and after this change.
Fig. 4. Flowchart of the same error types following changes made to policies and procedures, whereby certain errors were
stopped earlier or were hampered from progressing.
A revised error pathway chart (Fig. 4) demonstrates how some of these changes have altered
potential paths. For example, by performing in vivo dosimetry off-axis rather than on central
axis, we essentially closed the pathway for the error to propagate beyond the second fraction,
thereby reducing the longevity from high to medium.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
To date, no one has studied the dosimetric impact of global errors in radiation oncology. Al-
though there is heightened awareness that with the increase of automated devices there must be
a parallel increase in quality check systems and processes, errors do and will continue to occur.
This study has helped us identify and prioritize potential errors in our clinic according to fre-
quency and dosimetric impact. For example, to reduce the use of an incorrect wedge direction,
our clinic employs off-axis in vivo dosimetry. To avoid a treatment distance setup error, we use
94 Klein et al.: Errors in radiation oncology... 94
Journal of Applied Clinical Medical Physics, Vol. 6, No. 3, Summer 2005
both vertical table settings and optical distance indicator (SSD) values to properly setup fields.
We strongly recommend that clinics focus their CQI efforts on errors that have high frequency
and/or errors with high dosimetric impact and longevity and devise solutions to minimize such
errors. As the R&V systems become more automated, there may be a positive and/or negative
consequence. On the one hand, there will be increased desire for automation of patient setup
and field appropriation (autofield sequencing). Simultaneously, these systems will also have
higher degrees of connectivity with treatment planning and virtual simulation workstations via
DICOM-RT, thereby facilitating more accurate and efficient data transfer. This will require
further error analyses.
Although the error scenarios and resolutions described in this paper are relevant mainly to
our clinic, we feel many lessons can be extended to facilities, large and small. Our comprehen-
sive in vivo dosimetry program can be implemented at any clinic. Bernier et al.(10) describe an
EORTC study of quality assurance programs that emphasizes the need for adequate staffing
and training and wisely suggest plans for dummy runs for new procedures. Lanson et al.(11)
describe a very comprehensive in vivo dosimetry program that details the rationale for such a
program. Finally, Brundage et al.(7) describe an audit for a regional cancer center and how an
audit system can analyze errors to find root causes. This is similar to our event-reporting sys-
tem, which has led to systematic changes.
Finally, we want to stress that the radiation oncology team must be constantly vigilant be-
cause no computer system can compensate for a team member’s error in judgment,
misunderstanding of physical concepts or technological limitations, or unsatisfactory planning
and delivery of radiation therapy. We have begun examining potential errors in IMRT accord-
ing to likelihood, pathways, and dosimetric impact, which we will report on at a later time.
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